Linux ASLR Curiosities

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- Address space layout randomization
- First came out as a PaX feature in about 2002
- Makes an attacker's life harder
- Now has reached most mainstream OS
Known info leak?

- It's well understood that /proc/pid contains information that would defeat ASLR for a local attack.
- The kernel developers thought about /proc/pid/maps.
- They recently decided to blank /proc/pid/maps if you cannot ptrace attach to pid (2.6.22).
It's a little known fact that /proc/pid/stat and wchan will leak information such as instruction pointer and stack pointer.

Try `ps -eo pid,eip,esp,wchan`.

Has been protected in GRSecurity for 7 years.
Exploitable to defeat ASLR?

- We only have scarce samples (Kstkeip is only updated during context switches and syscalls)
- An i/o bound or blocking process will leak very few samples
- It's not obvious or intuitive if this is enough information to reconstruct the address space
Let's try

- X86 is a variable width architecture
- We know what code is loaded in the target process
- By disassembling this code and recording instruction boundaries, we can create a unique "fingerprint" of the code it contains.
- Are the very few (a dozen or so) samples we can read enough to reconstruct AS layout?